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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
statute is not necessary under the Alvick case, the Court was there considering
the method of obtaining the psychiatric report; whereas, here it was not the
method that was challenged, but the failure to obtain it at the essential time.
The Court is not restricting the decision in the Alvich case but taking that
rule as broadly stated there and further defining it. The examination is
irrelevant to the conviction but is required to aid the judge in exercising his
discretion as to whether to impose a determinate or indeterminate sentence.
The requirement is, therefore, that the report submitted to the judge be current
according to this statutory purpose. The examination given aften the indictment
is mainly for the purpose of determining whether the defendant is sane and
capable of understanding the charges against him. As such it is hardly sufficient
for the purpose of sentencing. The manner and method of obtaining the report
may be satisfied by substantial compliance with the statute, but there may be
no deviation from the rule that the report be current.
Bd.
"PRESUPTION OF CONCURRENCE" OF SENTENCES STRICTLY LIMITED
When a defendant in a criminal proceeding is convicted of more than one
offense, the trial court has the discretionary power to impose cumulative rather
than concurrent sentences.30 Some courts have held that where the trial judge
failed to specifically exercise his discretion and failed to state that the sentences
imposed were consecutive, a presumption arose that the terms were to be
concurrent.31 These decisions were based upon an extension of the Court of
Appeals' holding in People v. Ingber.3 2 In that case, however, the Court only
stated that when a defendant sentenced at the same time for two or more
offenses had been tried at the same term of court before the same judge, and
where the judge omitted through inadvertence to make the terms successive,
there was a presumption that the terms were meant to be concurrent.83
In Browne v. New York State Board of Parole,8 4 the Court of Appeals
construed Ingber strictly, reversing both the Appellate Division"5 and Special
Terms6 decisions based on the broader interpretations of that opinion. Pe-
titioner, who was on probation following sentencing as a youthful offender for
the misdemeanor of attempted extortion, was subsequently convicted of at-
tempted sodomy, first degree robbery, first degree grand larceny and second
and third degree assault. He was sentenced to an indefinite term on each count,
the sentences to run concurrently and not consecutively, but no reference was
made to his prior sentence for the misdemeanor which was still outstanding.
30. N.Y. Penal Law § 2190; People v. Ingber, 248 N.Y. 302, 162 N.E. 87 (1928).
31. E.g., People ex rel. Winelander v. Denno, 9 A.D.2d 898, 195 N.Y.S.2d 165 (2d
Dep't 1959); People ex rel. Gerbino v. Ashworth, 267 App. Div. 579, 47 N.Y.S.2d 551 (1st
Dep't 1944).
32. Supra note 30.
33. Id. at 305, 162 N.E. at 88.
34. 10 N.Y.2d 116, 218 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1961).
35. 25 Misc. 2d 1050, 207 N.Y.S.2d 488 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
36. -A.D.2d-, 211 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (2d Dep't 1961).
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The Board of Parole computed the maximum expiration date of petitioner's
term by treating the two sentences as running consecutively. Thereupon,
petitioner brought an Article 78 proceeding relying upon the "presumption of
concurrence." The Court of Appeals held that the presumption was not
applicable to sentences imposed at different times, in different courts and for
completely unrelated crimes. 37
The Court also stated that an Article 78 proceeding was the proper remedy
rather than habeas corpus, inasmuch as petitioner did not seek review of a
discretionary act of the Board, but rather, maintained that the Board's action
was erroneous as a matter of law.
38
Bd.
RIGHT o APPEAL AS POOR PERSON LIMITED BY COURT's DETERMINATION OF
CAUSE
The Code of Criminal Procedure grants to all defendants in a criminal
prosecution the right of appeal.3 9 To prevent this right of appeal from being an
empty right, the Rules of Civil Practice, Rule 35, enable a defendant to appeal
as a poor person and thereby obtain a copy of the transcript of all prior
proceedings at the expense of the State. The relator, in People ex rel. Baumgart
v. Martin,4" attempted to appeal as a poor person from the dismissal of a writ of
habeas corpus.
The relator, convicted of murder in the second degree, applied for a writ
of habeas corpus challenging the jurisdiction of the court to find a verdict on
the ground that only eleven jurors had answered the polling of the jury. At the
hearing it was found that this was only a stenographic error in the record and
the writ was denied; whereupon, relator filed a notice of appeal. Relator, in
the meantime, prosecuted an appeal from the original judgment of conviction
based upon the same grounds as the writ. The original judgment was affirmed in
both the Appellate Division 4l and the Court of Appeals,42 and certiorari was
subsequently denied by the United States Supreme Court.43 Respondent then
made a motion in the Appellate Division to dismiss the dormant appeal from
the denial of the writ of habeas corpus, and at the same time relator made a
cross motion for leave to appeal as a poor person. The Appellate Division denied
relator's motion for permission to appeal as a poor person and granted
respondent's motion for dismissal for failure to file and serve the printed papers
on appeal as required by Rule 234 of the Rules of Civil Practice.
The determination of this case hinged upon the fundamental question of
37. The Court noted that it had already rejected the contention that a presumption
of concurrence was applicable in the case of two unrelated crimes. See, People on Petition
of Aronstein ex rel. Mello v. Warden, 1 A.D.2d 977, 150 N.Y.S.2d 915 (2d Dep't 1956).
38. Cf. Hines v. State Board of Parole, 293 N.Y. 254, 56 N.E.2d 572 (1944).
39. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 517.
40. 9 N.Y.2d 351, 214 N.Y.S.2d 370 (1961).
41. 6 Afl.2d 854, 175 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (4th Dep't 1958).
42. 5 N.Y.2d 874, 182 N.Y.S.2d 24 (1959).
43. 359 U.S. 994 (1959).
